From the Arctic to the desert, NATO allies have a responsibility to prepare for the operational environment of the future.
Op-ed published by the Montreal Gazette, October 2025.
As experts convene in Montreal for NATO’s Climate Security Summit on Oct. 8-9, one reality is clear: while the U.S. may be stepping back from framing climate as a national security issue, the operational impacts of climate change are unavoidable.
From Arctic ice to desert heat, operating conditions shape the odds of military success. As a consequence, changes in those conditions shape the success of the future force. In that context, climate change and its impacts cannot help but be an important element of military planning.
That clarity is easy to lose in the fog of climate politics. A recent U.S. Department of Energy report casts doubt on consensus climate projections, implying uncertainty means you don’t have to act.
In security discussions, the logic is the opposite: If you wait for complete certainty on the battlefield, the outcome is likely to be disastrous.
Militaries don’t wait for perfect information; they plan against risk, probability and consequence. The Center for Climate and Security filed a public comment endorsed by more than 20 national security leaders that highlighted the flaws in that logic using a security frame — that risk itself demands response.
The challenge is compounded by formal policy.
In March, the U.S. secretary of defence issued a memo directing the military to remove references to climate change from official guidance. NATO, too, has been tempted to de-emphasize climate in its public language. But operational realities cannot be wished away. Alliance planners must resist that temptation because climate change will continue to shape the Future Operational Environment, or FOE, whether it’s publicly named or not.
The Arctic is a clear case study of this principle. Retreating sea ice, thawing permafrost, and new maritime routes are reshaping the region in real time. For the United States, Canada and their NATO allies, the Arctic is not a distant abstraction but a theatre of strategic competition and homeland defence.
Russia is investing heavily in Arctic bases and capabilities, while China refers to itself as a “near-Arctic state.” Meanwhile, NATO nations must contend with fragile infrastructure, unpredictable operating conditions and new demands on mobility and logistics.
This reality illustrates the need to plan for the FOE. Forces, bases and systems last decades. Aircraft purchased today will still be flying in 2050; installations built today will still be in service at century’s end. Infrastructure for the planned “Golden Dome” missile defence system will need to consider permafrost risks for infrastructure built in the Arctic, including at sites that would likely require Canadian participation.
Maritime infrastructure, too, must anticipate the potential for sea-level rise as well as worsening storm impacts. Anticipating the possibility of 2C global warming by 2050 means incorporating those conditions into today’s procurement and infrastructure designs.
None of this requires a shift in military culture. It builds on existing practice. The security community has long planned for contingencies under uncertainty — from nuclear deterrence to counterterrorism to great power competition. The same mindset must apply to climate.
Ignoring risk does not make it disappear; it only magnifies the costs when disruptions occur.
It is easy for both opponents and proponents to be distracted by the military’s use of fossil fuels and to misplace the emphasis there, facilitating animated policy arguments. For the military, however, climate security is more about missions than emissions. It is about safeguarding readiness, ensuring deterrence and protecting national interests in a changing operational landscape.
Politicizing the issue and demanding absolute certainty before acting misses the point. For security planners, the imperative is resilience to a broad range of possible futures: to anticipate change, build flexibility and ensure that when conditions shift, forces are ready to respond.
The U.S. Department of Energy’s report may have attempted to minimize climate risks, but militaries cannot afford to do so. The operational environment of the future will be shaped by future climate conditions, whatever they may be, and militaries have a responsibility to prepare for them.
This op-ed is authored by John Conger and published on 07 October, 2025. You can access the original version by using the link here.
See below for our coverage on similar topics:
- Military spending rises and greenhouse gas emissions: What does the research say?
- The UK Ministry of Defence, “Low-Carbon Warfare,” and the struggle to construct novel sociotechnical imaginaries of future war
- NATO and climate change: Towards a joint understanding and response