Expert comment published by Armament Industry European Research Group, IRIS - Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, 2 March 2026.
The increase in defence spending in recent years has prompted new equipment acquisitions, with European countries primarily focusing on replenishing inventories. In view of the European Union’s (EU) 2030 Green Deal goals, what is the impact of the acquisitions on the environmental and energy transition in defence, and what are the required critical raw materials (CRM)? In this comment, Ester Sabatino (International Institute for Strategic Studies) discusses the geopolitical importance of CRMs for defence and the green transition and assesses how disruptions to the related supply chain can affect defence in Europe.
Energy And Environmental Transition in the Armed Forces
Efforts towards environmental and energy transition in the defence sector support the EU's goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and are mainly undertaken at the national level. Several countries have either defined their national defence strategies regarding the impact of climate change on the military or established policies to reduce their armies' environmental footprint and implement energy transition. Examples of these developments are:
- energy and water self-sufficient external operations camps,
- virtual trainings,
- requirements for biofuels use for Defence business trips,
- and blending fossil and biofuels for air force equipment.
The Strategic Relevance of Critical Raw Materials
The armed forces’ energy and environmental transition and their increasing reliance on digital technologies, electrification, and alternative energy solutions will place greater pressure on demand for materials used in both sectors, such as rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and graphite. Even though the environmental and energy transitions in defence would provide the armed forces with alternatives to dependence on energy supply chains, they would also introduce new vulnerable strategic supply chains and geopolitical risks. The EU relies heavily on third-party actors for CRM; therefore, CRMs are deemed economically vital and risky to substitute, given potential supply disruptions that are costly in economic and performance terms.
China currently holds a de facto monopoly on the supply of CRM, on which European countries rely for the vast majority of their required materials. When it comes to materials exported by China, export restrictions peaked in 2025 with two waves of Chinese critical minerals requiring an export approval from Beijing, and included restrictions on the transfer of processing know-how.
Main European Activities to Ensure Security of Supply of Critical Raw Materials
The security of supply for CRM has been a central topic for the EU and its member states, but it is only in the last couple of years that discussions and policy decisions have been more focused. At the EU level, actions include the December 2025 RESource EU Action Plan, which aims to diversify CRM supply and enhance recycling, while restricting exports of scraps and waste containing CRM.
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is focusing on activities to enhance the circularity of CRM and its environmental impact, through projects like the Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED). These efforts aim to optimise production, management, and recycling, but haven't yet ensured EU independence in CRM supply to meet defence and environmental needs. Strategic international partnerships seek to diversify resources and reduce supply chain risks.
Looking Forward
After delineating the major European measures and activities implemented to ensure security of supply, the commentary concludes by arguing that steps taken to promote wider use of alternative materials and sources, international partnerships, and increased recycling of materials might not be enough to ensure both conventional defence production and the environmental and energy transition in defence. Without sustained emphasis and support for access to diversified CRM provisions, including indigenous processing, material dependencies will continue to limit both Europe’s strategic autonomy and the credibility of its green transition in the defence sector.
This text is based on extracts from the comment by Ester Sabatino (Research Fellow, IISS) published by Armament Industry European Research Group, hosted by IRIS - Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques. To read the full paper, click here.