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# CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

## Lessons From Emerging Practice

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MERCY CORPS

# Executive Summary

While research into the link between climate exposure and conflict continues, there is growing consensus that they intersect, and that each may compound the other in various ways. While it is essential that we continue to build our understanding of the relationship, some organisations are already developing strategies and interventions to address conflict-climate dynamics.

With support from the UK's Department for International Development, Mercy Corps set out to gather and analyse examples of work in this area, and to convene experts, operational organisations and donors to identify areas that are ripe for further development and piloting, for taking to scale, or for further research.

Case studies fell into three groups. The first, largest group is working at a community scale on acute conflicts, most of which target potential conflict arising from shared resource use, either addressing resource competition or promoting conflict resolution mechanisms. A second, smaller group is working at the system level; integrating climate fragility into national or regional action or policy. A third group is employing analytical frameworks integrating conflict and climate, either integrating conflict into participatory disaster risk assessments, integrating climate information into conflict analyses, or in a few cases investing in 'analytical deep dives' that offer a deeper understanding of the interactions amongst social, economic and environmental dynamics.

## FINDINGS

**A number of key themes emerged:**

- **Environmental peacebuilding and natural resource management approaches account for most of the current efforts.** Relatively few have fully taken into account the threat of climate change per se.

- While there is widespread acknowledgement that the impacts of climate change need to be addressed at multiple scales, **the majority of case studies looked to address challenges at local, community levels**.

- **Organisations are prioritising efforts to address livelihood insecurity, but only in the short-term.** While many focus on adoption of "climate-smart" agricultural techniques, resource sharing and management strategies and disaster risk reduction techniques, the majority of these address relatively short-term risks, and do not attempt to diversify livelihoods away from those which are natural resource dependent.

- **Promising practices in addressing systems level variables that contribute to conflict are rarer but emerging**. Some organisations are working at a system level, addressing issues of weak governance, international resource management frameworks, and social exclusion.

- **Assessments and early warning systems will need to adapt and further integrate climate and conflict risks and concerns.** Some climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction practitioners have begun applying conflict sensitivity lenses to their vulnerability and disaster risk assessments. Conflict practitioners have begun piloting approaches to incorporate climate data alongside information from conflict analyses. Some agencies

have begun investing in the development of predictive tools to identify future conflict "hotspots" through sophisticated modeling programmes based on complex sets of related indicators. This integration of diverse risks should be further developed.

**However, very significant barriers and challenges remain:**

- **Diverse motivations, approachs and language.** If we are to address the implications of climate and conflict, actors from traditionally distinct disciplines must come together, including policy, academic, security, peacebuilding and climate experts - each of whom brings their own perspective, objectives and language. This hinders effective sharing of deep and relevant expertise across disciplines.

- **Assessments fail to illustrate causal pathways between climate change effects and conflict risks.** Many of the assessments lack a clear narrative of the dynamics between climate change and conflict, limiting their potential for identifying a broader set of strategies to address climate-conflict dynamics, and move beyond the NRM approaches which currently dominate this space.

- **The time scales of climate impacts and strategies to address them**. It is not possiblye to predict precisely how climate change will impact on any given location, community or activity in the future, making it challenging to design interventions that could respond to current and future threats. Similarly it is unreasonable to seek to measure the success of strategies enacted today which seek to address future climate fragility dynamics, that may play out over decades.

- **Measuring impact**. The majority of case studies made reference to positive gains in reducing fragility, or improved social cohesion, but few were formally evaluated. There is therefore insufficient evidence to understand any systemic change as related to climate vulnerability.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**The following are key entry points for reducing conflict and climate risks, and should be further scaled and mainstreamed where possible:**

- **Environmental peacebuilding, conflict sensitive adaptation and resilience building.** While not new, in a world threatened by both conflict and climate threats, and in recognition that each may compound the other, there is a strong case for much greater investment in such integrated approaches. However **further analysis and more rigorous program evaluation, across multiple geographies, are required to identify the most effective approaches.**

- **Early warning and early response systems.** A number of early warning systems that integrate both climate and conflict risks, and that these should be evaluated and the best adopted more widely in contexts facing both risks.

**The following interventions and tools need further development and testing:**

- **Integrated analysis:** effective responses will depend on accessible and cost-effective national and local assessment processes that allow us to better understand conflict-climate dynamics. New approaches which acknowledge the complexity of these

issues seperately and together, while also fitting into the standard programme lifecycle should be prioritised.

- **Natural resource management beyond the community level.** Most interventions identified worked at the community level, with only two seeking to scale this to the sub-national, national level or international level; and few focused on the more systemic underlying drivers of conflict (such as poor governance, unequal power-sharing, or inequitable national policies around, for example, land use).

- **Livelihoods change and diversification** are also mostly developed on a very localised scale, and in a way that addresses relatively short-term risks. These should be considered much more broadly, including in municipal and national development plans, and should consider the longer-term implications of climate change on livelihood security.

- **Transboundary adaptation.** Further focus should be brought to transboundary cooperation on topics such as migration, adaptation and conflict management - particularly in contexts where there are common pool resources across borders.

- **Production and uptake of 'consumable forecasting' and climate information services.** Currently there is relatively limited uptake of even mid-range forecasting (3-6 months), let alone at the decades level. Further work must be done to ensure climate analysis and predictions are accessible and useful in both programme design and policy.

- **Translating early-warning into early action.** While there are a number of promising approaches to integrated early warning systems, work is needed to ensure early warning is linked to early action including ensuring new resources are available and the use of crisis modifiers to adapt existing programmes.

- **Meso level governance capacity building.** Often the most relevant institutions to key issues around conflict and climate are at the municipal, sub-national or national level, and yet few of the case studies we identified were working at these scales.

- **Land security, tenure and use** were identified as critical drivers of climate-related conflict, as well as barriers to effective adaptation in conflict affected places. However, none of the case studies we identified within this project were working on this issue.

Effectively addressing conflict and climate will require the unified efforts of experts from different disciplines, donors, civil society, the private sector, authorities and communities themselves. This means far greater collaboration than is the norm, despite the contrasting objectives, language, budget cycles, timescales and risk appetite. Efforts to break down silos and to harmonise, sequence and learn from each others' interventions will be critical to success.

# Section 1: Background

## Assembling Emerging Practice

While evidence of a direct link between climate exposure and conflict or instability is contested, there is growing consensus that climate change and conflict intersect, and that each may compound the other in a variety of ways (see section 2).

While this logic is increasingly well understood, what is less well understood is how to address it. The relationship between climate change, socioeconomic and political variables, and insecurity is complex and context specific. It will require a systems approach to identify the challenges and design effective interventions that can both promote climate change adaptation in fragile and conflict affected settings and address climate related factors that exacerbate drivers of conflict.

With support from the UK's Department for International Development, Mercy Corps set out to gather case studies from an as broad as possible range of actors to identify promising practice in this area. After an initial brief review of the current state of evidence on the linkages between conflict and climate (see section 2) we identified a number of likely areas of practice. We sent initial inquiries with a short survey to 119 organisations, networks and individuals working in this space, including NGOs, academics, private sector actors, UN agencies and donors. After some further follow up and discussion, 17 organisations offered 21 case studies, of which 16 were selected for more detailed examination, on the basis that they were the most valuable for informing future action. Others were not included, either because the project itself was not clearly linked to addressing conflict and climate, or (more often) because we were not able to collect sufficient information about the project to draw useful conclusions at this point.

On 11 March 2020 Mercy Corps convened a workshop of 47 representatives of donors, NGOs, UN agencies and academics to discuss the case studies in more detail and to identify areas that are ripe for further development and piloting, for taking to scale, or for research. This report is based on the discussions at that workshop.

**It is to be noted that there are of course limitations to this approach**. This is a relatively new area, and therefore many of the projects examined were in the early stages. Of those that were completed, few had been formally evaluated. Others were showing impact at the conflict and climate nexus but had not necessarily been designed with this framing in mind. There is significant sample bias, given that the Mercy Corps team naturally has more contacts within the NGO and academic worlds, than in the private sector or local government. We were also heavily reliant on willing counterparts providing what details they could of their projects, rather than having any capacity or authority to conduct more formal evaluations. Finally in order to focus our efforts, we did not examine the links between climate mitigation interventions (such as transitions to green energy) and conflict, although this is an interesting area for further analysis.

# Mercy Corps' Evolving Work In Conflict And Climate

For well over 10 years, Mercy Corps has been implementing programmes at the intersection of conflict and the environment, as a cornerstone of our Peace and Conflict portfolio. Our work in this space has long focused on laying the foundations for peace by promoting equitable and inclusive natural resource management and by using natural resources as a platform for building social cohesion and advancing cooperation.

Across Central America, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Mercy Corps programmes were designed to give people the tools, skills and support they need to respond to complex natural resource conflicts, and help local communities improve local and regional resource management and dispute resolution.

In 2017-2018, Mercy Corps began to recognise the changing nature of the threats our programme participants were experiencing, and that we must better understand the relationship between the environment and conflict in order to identify appropriate solutions. Two key areas of threat emerged: those related to conflict, and those related to the environment, specifically, climate change. Bringing together our in-house experts in peace and conflict and in climate and environment programming, and our work across humanitarian and development efforts, Mercy Corps identified a number of ways in which climate change was negatively interacting with conflict. This led us to re-evaluate our approach.

Previously the bulk of our environment and conflict programming had focused on reducing acute conflict related to localised resource sharing, or resource protection and governance. Our new Climate Change and Conflict approach takes a systems approach, linking macro trends (such as population growth or environmental degradation) and socioeconomic and political variables (social exclusion, poverty or poor governance) with direct and indirect climate impacts to understand the ways in which stability is threatened, and identify entry points for addressing these risks.

Today, Mercy Corps is scaling up programming to address the climate-conflict link in places like Mali, Uganda and Ethiopia, and is generating evidence to support more effective programming and policy. Our focus areas include:

1.  Build capacity of institutions to create an enabling environment for peace and environmental sustainability, including capacity to manage natural resources, address tensions and disputes, and respond to disasters effectively.

2.  Support strong and diversified livelihoods that are food secure, which lower the risk of conflict between groups over scarce resources and allow communities to be more resilient to climate shocks and stresses.

3.  Manage use of and competition over natural resources to reduce conflict, and in some cases contribute to building social cohesion and peace through dialogue and cooperation.

# Section 2: State of the evidence on the link between climate change and conflict

Although climate change may not (so far, as far as we know) have *directly* led to conflict, an increasing body of research indicates that climate factors may exacerbate those issues that do directly drive conflict, and this is increasingly accepted by policymakers and practitioners.

DFID's Building Stability Framework calls climate change a "threat multiplier", accelerating pressures on fragile states and challenging their capacity to manage change.[1] Climate change (or at least variability) can impact economic growth, resource scarcity and competition, food security and migration. These in turn contribute to an increased risk of conflict, worse in contexts lacking the building blocks described in the Building Stability Framework that drive long-term stability.

Nevertheless important uncertainties about when, and under what conditions climate change can lead or contribute to conflict, remain. A number of arguments explaining the mechanisms that link climate change to conflict - food insecurity, intergroup inequality, land use, recent history of conflict, etc. - have been made based on theoretical grounds, yet there is a dearth of empirical analysis of such mechanisms, and those that exist tend to be in a handful of geographical locations. Empirical studies would provide supporting evidence for these indirect links, and would also provide much needed insights into the magnitudes of the effects of each mechanism. More qualitative case studies are needed to explore these dynamics further, and research will also need to be spread across a larger number of geographical locations.[2]

Research to date indicates the following:

**Climate change may amplify conflict risks.** In July 2018, the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed described the impact of climate change as a threat multiplier that puts additional stress on existing political, social and economic pressures.[3] However as the Overseas Development Institute has identified, the structural causes, pathways,[4] macro-economic tendencies and mechanisms[5] through which climate change and conflict interact are not yet well understood. Despite a broad acceptance of the multiplying impacts of climate change on conflict, on-the-ground evidence is often missing to substantiate claims made in policy circles, and existing studies lack statistical rigour, or are producing generally ambiguous results.[6]

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[1] DFID. (2016). *Building Stability Framework*. London: DFID, p.14.

[2] Various sources, for example: Altpeter, C. (2016). *FBA Brief: Environmental Governance, Climate Change and Peacebuilding*. Sweden: International Expert Forum (IEF), FBA.

[3] United Nations Security Council. (2018). Letter dated 30 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. S/2018/749 .

[4] Mercy Corps. (2018). *Conflict and Climate Approach.* Portland.

[5] USAID. (2020). *Pathways to Peace: Addressing Conflict and Strengthening Stability in a Changing Climate*. Washington, DC: USAID.

[6] ODI. (2020). *Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Executive Summary and Recommendations*. London: ODI.

**Climate change does not appear to be the most influential factor, on its own.** In existing quantitative studies, climate variability and/or change is low on the ranked list of the most influential conflict drivers, and experts rank it as the most uncertain in its influence. Experts agree, however, that even with the inherent uncertainty of climate projections, the continued intensification of climate change will very likely be an amplifier of conflict risks[7]. On the same ranked list of conflict drivers; low capabilities of the state and intergroup inequality stand out as the most important factors influencing armed conflict, followed by low socioeconomic development and recent history of violent conflict.

**Climate change applies significant pressure on already fragile contexts.** The effects of climate change are more likely to lead to conflict when combined with weak governance and institutions. For example, in areas affected by climate change, poor governance structures may contribute to unsustainable or negative coping strategies as well as the absence of measures to increase resilience and encourage adaptation.[8] Several studies confirmed that conflict risks are higher in those contexts where communities lack the institutions, economic stability and voice to cope with increases in the frequency and severity of climate change impacts.[9]

**Climate change may undermine the ability of governments to deliver services for their populations.** Failure to meet society's expectations risks leading to civil unrest. The combination of negative impacts of climate change on livelihoods, with limited governance capacity has also been linked to the growth of non-state armed groups, terrorism and organised crime.

**Natural hazard-related disasters, including climate-related, have negative impacts on peace and security dynamics.** Environmental degradation and natural resource management (NRM) issues are being accelerated by climate-related shocks and stresses and seen as exacerbating conflict.[10] Acute shocks as a result of climate-related events can affect social, economic and political stability, especially where governance structures are weak.[11]

**Conversely, communities' ability to adapt to and cope with climate change is severely impacted by conflict, and elements of fragility**. Good governance, including fair power structures and effective and legitimate institutions are critical to ensuring sustainable adaptation to climate change in the long term. More immediately they are key to helping states and communities avoid disastrous outcomes from climate extremes, including violence, food crises, and the large-scale displacement of populations.[12]

**Under certain conditions, environmental factors can be used to promote dialogue, development and peacebuilding**. In fact, research and historical record demonstrating how natural resource scarcity and environmental challenges can lead to cooperation is stronger than evidence on climate change as a driver of conflict. From the mid-1990s there was a shift in the debate with increased attention of researchers and policymakers on cooperation over the use

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[7] Mach, K.J., Kraan, C.M., Adger, W.N. *et al.* (2019). *Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict*. Nature 571, p.194.

[8] Altpeter, C. (2016). *FBA Brief: Environmental Governance, Climate Change and Peacebuilding*. Sweden: International Expert Forum (IEF), FBA, p.4.

[9] UNEP. (2011). cited in Mosello, B., Rüttinger L., Sauerhammer L. (2019). *The climate change-conflict connection – The current state of knowledge*, Berlin: Climate Security Expert Network, p. 6.

[10] ODI. (2020). *Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Executive Summary and Recommendations*. London: ODI.

[11] Schaik, et. al.; Making peace with climate adaptation, Background paper for the Global Commission on Adaptation, Clingendael, 2019, p.10. Available at:
https://cdn.gca.org/assets/2019-09/Making_peace_with_climate.pdf

[12] USAID. (2018). *The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks*, Washington, DC: USAID.

and exploitation of natural resources, particularly between states over international rivers. The cases showed that cooperation over natural resources was not only possible, but also far more common than outbreaks of armed conflict.[13] However, while cooperation and collaboration tend to increase in the immediate post-disaster context - social conflict may later increase if disruptions to lives and services continue.[14]

**However there is also evidence that climate change strategies can contribute to conflict risks.** Some studies have shown that climate change adaptation can have a stabilising influence on weak fragile states and reduce vulnerabilities, conflict, crime and insecurity[15] However, according to ODI, while the evidence base is limited, some evidence suggests that disaster risk reduction and climate change mitigation and adaptation programmes can have a potentially negative impact on peace and security.[16] Further research is required to investigate these initial findings and account for diverse experiences and to ensure a 'do no harm' approach is adopted in future adaptation programmes.

**Finally, we do not have sufficient research to indicate how climate change and conflict may intersect across communities and geographies.** Currently, the majority of evidence regarding the pathways by which climate change affects conflict outcomes is from the Sahel and East Africa regions, with an underrepresentation of evidence from other climate fragile regions. As such, a limited number of socio-economic contexts are being considered in defining the challenges.

# Section 3: Promising practices and emerging learning

The purpose of this project was to better understand the range of approaches and strategies development and humanitarian actors were implementing to address climate-conflict dynamics. The workshop participants and Mercy Corps' analysts reviewed and discussed the collected case studies, and were able to draw a number of inferences. In the following section, we describe the most relevant case studies, which fell broadly into three groups - those working at the community level, those working at a larger, systemic level, and those focused on developing new analytical frameworks - and set out initial learnings from our analysis and the discussions of these case studies at the workshop. Finally, we articulate a number of recommendations for elements that should be further developed, piloted or scaled, based on the workshop conclusions.

## Case Studies

The following section describes the current state of play of approaches and promising practices. In providing this summary we highlight illustrative and distinct approaches and practices taken by a range of institutions. These are representative of the broader set of cases reviewed as part of this work.

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[13] Altpeter, C. (2016). p.3.
[14] ODI. (2020). *Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Executive Summary and Recommendations.* London: ODI.
[15] Mosello, B., Rüttinger L., Sauerhammer L. (2019). *The climate change-conflict connection – The current state of knowledge*, Berlin: Climate Security Expert Network, p. 6.
[16] ODI. (2020). *Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Executive Summary and Recommendations,* London: ODI.

# Group 1: Acute Conflicts, Community Scale

Of the case studies selected, the majority focused on addressing acute conflict, or spikes in conflict, and typically worked at the community scale. Most targeted the potential for conflict arising from shared resource use. Natural resource governance and use is considered both as potential causes of conflict, and a potential solution, which can provide additional peace dividends when addressed effectively.

## Focusing on Localised Scale

Programmes typically focused on a central geography - town, village, sub-district - where interventions take place. Boundaries are often delineated in ethno-social or political terms, less often along the lines of landscape features. In some cases, such as TearFunds' Self-Help Group model, or Mercy Corps' own PEACE-III programme, reference was made to supporting horizontal linkages beyond the intervention zone, including from town to district level, or across national governments. In rare examples, activities targeted central governments, markets, higher-level stakeholders or decision making bodies outside of the principle zones of intervention.

- **The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)** aims to increase access to water, alleviating the pressure on resources and reducing tensions related to the use of resources in **Yemen**. In numerous locations, in both the highlands and the coastal plain, local social tensions and grievances arose around access to increasingly scarce water resources. The ICRC worked to reduce the demand for and competition around shared water resources (groundwater, springs, and surface flows in wadis) between villages and in some cases between users (domestic versus agriculture), by seeking to make more water available through non-conventional and more sustainable means, rather than extracting more groundwater. These include rainwater harvesting, terracing rehabilitation and spate irrigation. Such activities contributed to managing the use of and competition over natural resources by making more water available without exacerbating stress on the resource that is the source of the tensions.

- **Mercy Corps** designed the 'Communities Helping their Environment and Land by Bridging Interests' (CHELBI) programme to reduce violence among pastoralist and agricultural communities in **Southern Ethiopia** by bringing communities together to resolve natural resource-based drivers of conflict. CHELBI helped communities identify shared interests and alternatives to violence by developing land use agreements, rehabilitating degraded resources, and building market linkages. The programme was implemented in four *woredas* spanning two states in Southern Ethiopia for 28 months (December 2013-March 2016). Using a people-to-people approach, CHELBI held a series of consultation meetings, community dialogues, and reflection workshops at the village and woreda levels. Local government, traditional leaders, and community members actively participated in defining key issues and challenges, mapping out resource conflicts, and developing long term solutions.

- **Concordis International** supports peaceful cross-border/seasonal pastoralist migration in **South Sudan.** Concordis' work focuses on promoting sustainable development and peaceful coexistence through inclusive dialogue between regional authorities, local communities and civil society actors. The programme is implemented in a context of tensions over land ownership and rights of access between several different groups, alongside a national land reform process aimed at transforming the country from

clan-based to individual land ownership. Climate change and accelerating desertification pose additional challenges by making the country vulnerable to food insecurity and resource scarcity. In this context, Concordis International has supported the opening of a common market in Amiet, South Sudan. It was established following joint meetings facilitated between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. The organisation has seen herders take up trading activities, skilled farmers become shopkeepers or shop owners leasing their shops to traders since the opening of Amiet market. The market is seen as an emerging symbol of peaceful coexistence for herders, farmers and traders.

## Resource Management and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

A number of programmes focused on managing resource competition and improving conflict resolution mechanisms. In most instances, resource management and conflict resolution were combined with an additional outcome, such as capacity building of institutions, the implementation of shared resource projects, or livelihood or market stimulation, to solidify gains. Inclusivity and the role of women, or civil society were considered in many cases.

- **Islamic Relief's programme in Mandera County, Kenya,** has two focus areas: (i) To build the capacity of customary and local government institutions to better manage tensions and prevent conflict, while also bringing women and youth into these structures to help them become more inclusive and sustainable: (ii) Support livelihood adaptation of Somali youth and women in Mandera and help them move away from over-reliance on pastoralism. Cattle-raiding is seen as a (male) cultural practice and owning livestock is a symbol of wealth and honour of the clan, although this idea is changing. However, young Somali men in Mandera have been reluctant to take up alternative livelihoods such as trades and services jobs (such as electrician, plumbing, computer services, etc.) because they were initially seen as undignified occupations. Engaging clan and faith leaders in advocating for the dignity of these occupations has led to increased interest and enrolment in vocational training activities.

- To support a stable and peaceful transition in **Nepal**, the **Inclusive Resource Management Initiative (IRMI) was launched by Mercy Corps** out of a recognition for the role that natural resources played in conflict. IRMI aimed to enhance stability through a holistic, people-to-people approach for conflict resolution and inclusive natural resource management. The programme, in partnership with the Backward Society Education (BASE) and Sahakarmi Samaj, operated in four districts in the western Terai for 39 months (June 2013– September 2016). By addressing natural resource-based conflicts, and building inclusive decision-making processes, IRMI created a platform for greater cooperation between communities, reduced competition over scarce resources, and strengthened resilience to climate and environmental shocks and stresses.

## Shorter-Term and Seasonal Resource Sharing

While a few notable case studies include reference to supporting longer-term stability against the implication of a changing climate, the large majority focus on static resource degradation or natural decline and its impact on existing tensions. Few cases made explicit reference to the potential interconnections between climate variability and violence in their design. Principle resources addressed under this category included: land, water and forests.

- **The Food and Agriculture Organization, together with Intergovernmental Authority on Development and local NGOs**, implemented programming to address the recurrent tensions and violent conflicts in the cross-border areas of **Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda**, where climate change has worsened intercommunal conflicts, straining pastoralist communities' ability to move their herds beyond their communities' own lands. Harmonised initiatives build on a tradition of resource sharing between neighbouring clans to promote the sharing of pastoral natural resources and the coordination of cross-border livestock movements. Work undertaken by FAO and IGAD allowed pastoralists from Turkana in Kenya to avoid the 2017 drought and move into Uganda to access grazing lands without causing conflicts with the local Karamojong people. FAO's experience shows that formal and/or informal institutions provide communication channels, institutionalised outlets and conflict resolution mechanisms to address shared environmental problems. Traditional structures may need to be reinvigorated or bolstered in order to maintain or regain legitimacy.

- **Mercy Corps' PEACE III programme in the Karamoja cluster** successfully promoted inter-communal cooperation around shared interests to reduce conflict. In Loyoro and Lake Turkana, the programme facilitated resource-sharing agreements between conflicting communities, enabling them to better cope with increased resource scarcity by agreeing on access norms and recognising common threats. PEACE III also brings the Turkana and Karamajong together around the Kobebe dam, a key shared water resource, to plant trees to prevent silting from livestock soil erosion. Projects evolved to further strengthen the dam as a connector between tribes, intertwining their interests and providing further incentives to peacefully manage conflict, for example establishing an animal vaccination and spaying center.

## Acute Risk Reduction

Others programmes in this group were designed to address spikes in conflict patterns often brought about by environmental shocks such as drought or flooding. There was, however, often little reference to the anthropogenic attributions of these shocks - rather they are understood as natural variation, combined with other aggravating macro-economic trends such as population growth, or market dysfunction. Few organisations make specific reference to addressing 'climate change'.

- **Tearfund** supports countries to carry out environmental and fragility assessments to inform country strategies. In **Ethiopia**, at the community level, Tearfund's target groups themselves have identified conflict, droughts, flooding and price inflations as the main development challenges. Since many rural communities depend partly or entirely on rain-fed agriculture and livestock rearing, drought affects a large proportion of the population, causing food insecurity and internal displacements. In response, Tearfund has been implementing a **Self-Help Group (SHG)** programme, focusing on savings and loans, to support resilience to environmental shocks. SHG can help strengthen community resilience for those with limited capacity to cope with shocks and stresses by encouraging members to make regular savings of small amounts, creating effective support during times of need, reducing the use of coping mechanisms and the potential for conflict. Under the Self-Help Group programme, Tearfund has trained facilitators who organise and document the outcomes of structured focus group discussions and these data are used in dialogue and advocacy with local government Disaster Risk

Management Teams. This has led to improved coping strategies by, for example, constructing water points, and destocking animals before the onslaught of drought reaches its climax.

- **Cordaid** works in close partnership with governing bodies, such as the National Environmental Management Authority and Law Reform Commission in **Kenya**. Through lobbying and advocacy, Cordaid promotes traditional conflict (risk) reduction mechanisms, such as facilitating dialogues on peace, (re-)establishing peacebuilding committees, and performing peace rituals. In Kenya, specific advocacy campaigns such as the Camel caravan campaign target decision makers in the drought and conflict affected areas. The Isiolo County Government has given Cordaid Kenya the opportunity to coordinate all activities amongst civil society organisations related to disaster risk management policy formulation. Cordaid also supports community institution building. The institutions create a sense of ownership and obligation among community members, promote sustainability and foster dissemination of knowledge and skills.

## Group 2: Working at the system level; integrating climate fragility into national or regional action or policy

As noted above, the majority of cases reviewed as part of this effort mostly focused on addressing climate fragility dynamics at the community level. While some of these efforts did make an effort at some broader influence on national or regional factors, these were more tangential and not articulated as the primary intention. Even fewer cases explicitly articulated approaches and goals which would seek to influence or build capacity of national or international institutions, integrate climate fragility elements into policies or seek to ensure political processes such as adaptation funding mechanisms that target conflict reduction efforts.

- **IISD** through its role as the Secretariat of the **National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Global Network**, is working on research into how to design and implement effective National Adaptation Planning (action designed to help countries and communities adapt to climate change) in contexts of fragility. The project targets policymakers and adaptation planners operating in fragile states, offering guidance into how they can develop these crucial plans in contexts of economic and political instability, and better integrate peacebuilding into adaptation planning. A number of NAPs already highlight the importance of adaptation as a mechanism for preventing land and water-use conflicts, particularly those that might arise among pastoralists and farmers, including the NAPs for Togo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Sudan's NAP, for example, highlights that many of the country's most recent conflicts have been between two opposing groups and that drought could further exacerbate these grievances (Republic of the Sudan, 2016). The government sees adaptation as a means of mitigating this risk by bringing opposing groups together to sustainably manage shared water and land resources (Republic of the Sudan, 2016). Similarly, Burkina Faso's NAP identifies establishing a National Observatory of Pastoralism as an adaptation priority, as it would promote lasting social peace among pastoralist groups through adaptation actions explicitly designed to reduce tensions relating to resource competition (Burkina Faso, Ministry of Environment and Fishery Resources, 2015). Finally, the Cameroonian NAP lists improved land governance as a key adaptation priority; without it, the degradation of arable land as a result of climate change will likely amplify the risk of conflict in the worst-affected regions

(Republic of Cameroon, 2015). In each of these cases, adaptation is recognised as a key mechanism for the prevention of climate-related conflicts.

- **EcoPeace Middle East** implements its **Water Energy Nexus** (WEN) programme in **Israel, Palestine and Jordan** in the context of regional water scarcity that is projected to be exacerbated by rapid population growth, rising standards of living, and climate change. The approach is regional, working to build cooperation across the three countries to counter the effects of climate change and its potential negative security implications, while advancing water and energy security region wide. At its core, WEN takes some of the approaches usually used by NGOs at the community level - resource sharing agreements and the development of interdependencies between groups - and seeks to scale them to the national and regional level. The project includes researching the technical, economic, and geo-political pre-feasibility of Jordan as a provider of large-scale renewable energy for the Levant with the coastal region of Israel and Gaza producing the desalinated water.

# Group 3: Analytical frameworks integrating conflict and climate

Analytical processes are a critical tool for guiding development investments, and for implementing agencies designing strategies and programmes. As such it's no surprise that this review identified a number of common and emerging practices and tools for context analysis that integrate conflict and climate to a greater or lesser extent. Given practitioners have only recently begun investment in this space, the bulk of assessment methodologies surfaced in this study worked to adapt existing tools, processes and methodologies. Many of these adaptations are working with analytical frameworks primarily designed around community engagement processes. This may contribute to the finding above highlighting the prevalence of focus on community scale interventions.

## Integrating Conflict into Participatory Disaster Risk Assessments

Participatory assessments which help communities to identify their risks and develop strategies and discrete interventions have been widely adopted by the development community. These relatively rapid processes are often at the center of community scale efforts focusing on disaster risk and climate vulnerability outcomes. In doing so they create a platform for collective action to address risks and vulnerabilities. Historically, these methodologies have not incorporated conflict dynamics, but a number of organisations have begun adapting these approaches to do so.

- **CordAid** works with Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) analyses and resilience action planning. The CMDRR is based on joint identification of risks, through a Participatory Disaster Risk Analysis (PDRA), and the implementation of community solutions for community problems. The approach enhances sustainability by ensuring knowledge is shared between partner organisations, DRR committees and other community members, and local government. Cordaid's participatory disaster risk analysis (PDRA) previously only focused on natural disasters but the organisation saw a need to dig deeper into conflict risks and added a conflict risk analysis component to the framework. An institutional-level and a community-level analytical tool have been developed for Cordaid's global resilience programme.

- **Christian Aid** utilizes their Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment methodology (PVCA). Christian Aid found the methodology to be effective in supporting risk-informed community development processes but saw a need to work more on

conflict and strengthen the focus on conflict sensitivity. The organisation therefore participated in the development of an Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide (ICPR), a process led by Saferworld, and engaged a consortium of partners within the START Network. This methodology builds on a combination of conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding methodologies developed by Saferworld, resilience approaches, PVCAs, and community-owned Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments. The ICPR has now been mainstreamed within Christian Aid through the inclusion in its Resilience Framework.

## Integrating climate information into conflict analyses

Conflict assessment and analysis tools have been developed to include specific focus on identifying a range of resource based conflicts affecting fragile environments, emphasizing disputes that most severely impact the environmental and economic well being of communities. In more recent history, this focus has been, albeit in a limited fashion, expanded, to include climate and science data to more effectively assess current and projected risks to resources, which could be the source of tensions or violence within or between communities.

- **Concordis International** has strong expertise and experience in conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programme design and implementation. The organisation is increasingly making use of climate science and early warning data in its analysis, programme design and implementation. These data are increasingly used in the established seasonal migration dialogue mechanism, implemented in South Sudan.

## Predictive Analytics for Resource Investment

As global modelling, information technology, and satellite imagery and other technologies have advanced, the development of early warning systems have taken on an increasing role. Processes and technology to monitor and predict dynamics in conflict risks continue to evolve, as does the integration of environment, weather and climate information.

- **The Water, Peace and Security Partnership (WPS)** formed to develop and apply tools to help address water related security risks. Unlike some of the more community focused participatory processes, their work generates understanding about the risks of water-related security threats by using big data, Artificial intelligence (AI), remote sensing and other tools to support complex analysis. The intent is to generate information for policy makers, including early warning signals and decision tools that indicate both where and when risks are increasing, and how they might be addressed. The core of the approach revolves around the analysis and monitoring of a complex set of social, economic and ecological indicators. The WPS just concluded a two year pilot-phase, with a focus on developing these tools to support actors across diplomacy, defense, development and disaster prevention.

## Analytical Deep Dives

Many of the assessment processes and tools described above are designed to provide a reasonable understanding of local dynamics in a relatively short time period. Others, though, have sought out assessment processes which go deeper, and in doing so are able to provide a more nuanced understanding of local climate fragility concerns. The extended timelines of these processes allow practitioners to take advantage of innovative partnerships, further employ or undertake technical studies (hydrological, climatological), while still engaging local stakeholders,

knowledge holders and vulnerable populations. The time and resource investment required for these processes prevent them from fitting into standard development project lifecycles. Yet, the additional time and more comprehensive data collection efforts provide an opportunity for deeper insights on root causes through a more complex understanding of the interactions amongst social, economic and environmental dynamics.

- **Adelphi** has conducted a climate-fragility risk assessment of the Lake Chad Basin. It is the product of an intensive two-year period of research across four countries. The assessment draws on long-term hydrological data from the Lake Chad basin, more than 200 interviews with community members, experts and officials, and an extensive review of the literature on the Lake Chad Basin. It aims to present a balanced, fact-driven conflict and climate risk assessment of the region. The resulting analysis provides concrete and scalable recommendations to policymakers, donor governments and implementing organisations on entry points to address the climate and conflict trap in the Lake Chad region.

- **Mercy Corps** has analysed climate-conflict dynamics via its Strategic Resilience Assessment (STRESS) process.[17] STRESS is a methodology that helps teams apply resilience thinking in distinct humanitarian or development contexts. One of the primary objectives of STRESS is to analyse unique contexts to understand how complex, interconnected drivers of instability threaten development goals; how these drivers impact groups differently; and what specific resilience abilities and resources these groups need to learn, cope, adapt and transform in the face of growing risk. Through processes in Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia and many others, the process has unpacked local dynamics between climate change, environmental trends and conflict risks.

# Emerging Learning

In synthesizing the case studies, interviews and relevant research, two overarching factors become clear. First, this is an evolving and dynamic area of exploration in which a range of implementing and donor institutions are actively engaged. Second, while this activity is positive, this is clearly a nascent field of work which is still establishing itself.

Distilling this landscape of activities reveals a few themes:

**Environmental peacebuilding approaches account for most of the current efforts.** Environmental peacebuilding refers to efforts to prevent, mitigate, resolve and recover from violent conflict via approaches to governing and managing natural resources. It originates from the acknowledgement that access to, and management of, natural resources have historically been a driver of conflicts. As such, it is not a surprise that initial efforts to address climate-conflict dynamics center around these approaches. Some of the most acute impacts of climate change are felt through impacts on the environment and its effects on the availability of natural resources.

**The majority of current programming is targeted at the community scale.** While there is widespread acknowledgement that the impacts of climate change need to be addressed at

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[17] Levine, E., Vaughan, E., & Nicholson, D. (2017). *Strategic Resilience Assessment Guidelines*. Portland, OR: Mercy Corps.

multiple scales, the majority of case studies looked to address challenges at local, community levels.[18] In line with the environmental peacebuilding theme identified above, many of these strategies involved addressing local natural resource governance gaps through the establishment of resource sharing agreements between communities, tribes or livelihood groups. Other approaches sought to enhance the social capital between programme participants, thereby lessening the chances of violent conflict arising. Some of these strategies seek to orchestrate collaborative natural resource management efforts (reforestation of hillsides, building of small water infrastructure projects, etc.) which have disaster risk or productivity benefits, while also resulting in greater cooperation between parties. Similarly, the development of financial resource sharing structures have been attempted in order to build a sense of community and cooperation amongst those preparing for extreme events such as droughts and floods.

**Organisations are prioritising efforts to address livelihood insecurity, but only in the short-term.** The increasing lack of livelihood security is a commonly cited pathway by which climate change can increase conflict risk.[19] Efforts to address such livelihood challenges often focus on adoption of "climate-smart" agricultural techniques, resource sharing and management strategies and disaster risk reduction techniques. Many of these approaches have proven track records in terms of reducing disaster risk, and building up the adaptive capacity of communities. However, the majority of these techniques address relatively short-term risks, and do not attempt to diversify livelihoods away from those which are natural resource dependent. This likely means that in the near to long-term, as the impacts of climate change amplify further, the benefits accrued from these programmes will erode.

**Promising practices in addressing systems level variables that contribute to conflict are rarer but emerging.** The majority of programming synthesized in this survey focused on managing the acute impacts of climate change to reduce conflict risk at the community level. However there are organisations which also sought strategies to address higher-level interventions which address issues of weak governance, international resource management frameworks, and social exclusion. These efforts defy easy categorisation as they vary significantly in their approach and objectives. Some sought to link siloed efforts to address climate change and conflict, by infusing conflict considerations into national level adaptation planning and policy. Others sought greater cooperation and resource sharing between countries through national level agreements which maximize individual strengths around water and energy. Finally, others sought to reduce social and economic exclusion in policy and planning processes related to resource governance and conflict management.

**Assessments and early warning systems will need to adapt and further integrate climate and conflict risks and concerns.** It is clear that as agencies have sought to address climate-conflict dynamics, standard assessment processes have had to adapt. Two common approaches rise to the top. The first is that climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction practitioners have begun applying conflict sensitivity lenses to their vulnerability and disaster risk assessments. The second, is that conflict practitioners have begun piloting approaches to incorporate climate data alongside information from conflict analyses. Finally, while not as

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18 Mimura, N., R.S. Pulwarty, D.M. Duc, I. Elshinnawy, M.H. Redsteer, H.Q. Huang, J.N. Nkem, and R.A. Sanchez Rodriguez, 2014: *Adaptation planning and implementation*. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts,Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L.White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 869-898.
19 https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/thematic-reading/knowledge-platform-new-climate-peace

prevalent, agencies have begun investing in the development of predictive tools to identify future conflict "hotspots" through sophisticated modeling programmes based on complex sets of related indicators.

However, very significant barriers and challenges remain:

**Lack of a common language.** As new risks and threats evolve, so too does language. If we are to fully understand and address the implications of climate and conflict, actors from traditionally distinct disciplines must come together, including policy, academic, security, peacebuilding and climate experts - each of whom brings their own perspective and language.

Examples of terminology used in work around climate change and conflict include:

- Environmental Peacebuilding
- Climate Security
- Climate Change and Conflict
- Climate Resilience
- Natural Resource Governance
- Climate-sensitive peacebuilding
- Conflict-sensitive climate change

Each has its own advantages and disadvantages (see Annex 1). However the fundamental issue remains that the lack of settled definitions and understanding across the multiple disciplines involved in this space hampers our ability to work together to build a rigorous body of evidence and to develop effective solutions. Typically, peace and conflict actors approach the nexus from a 'climate sensitive, conflict approach,' and climate science actors approach the nexus from a 'conflict sensitive, climate approach.' Starting from a sector specific approach may be limiting understanding of the scale of risk - and the generation of evidence on effective solutions.

**Lack of assessments which illustrate causal pathways between climate change effects and heightened conflict risks.** As noted in previous sections of this report, there are positive developments in assessments which seek to identify climate-conflict dynamics. However, many assessment processes still outline a set of climate change effects in siloe from the conflict risks also being analysed. Missing from many assessments is a more complex understanding or narrative of the dynamics between climate change and conflict. Developing such tools and processes will allow development actors to identify a broader set of strategies to address climate-conflict dynamics, and move beyond the NRM approaches which currently dominate this space.

**Challenges in 'defining success' and differing motives for integrating conflict and climate.** Beyond harmonising discourse, the disparate actors working in this space tend to have varying definitions of success. Some practitioners are focused on supporting fragile communities prepare for and face the impacts of climate change, usually with specific peace or climate adaptation outcomes. Conflict and the characteristics of fragility are viewed as a limiting factor in communities' adaptive capacity. Peace-builders, on the other hand, integrate climate change as a contributing factor to conflict, and tend to place it within current systems approaches to understanding conflict dynamics. Both of these approaches fit under widely accepted resilience framing – though begin from a discipline specific starting point.

**The time scales of climate impacts and strategies to address them.** While some effects of climate change can be felt today, the shape of their influence will likely be different in 5 or 10

years' time. It is certainly impossible to predict precisely how climate change will impact on any given location, community or activity. This makes it particularly challenging to design interventions that could respond to current and future threats, that may play out over decades. Similarly it is unreasonable to seek to measure the success of strategies enacted today which seek to address future climate fragility dynamics. One partial solution to this is to adopt a resilience approach.

**Measuring impact.** The majority of case studies made reference to positive gains in reducing fragility, or improved social cohesion, however, impact evaluations were rarely referenced, resulting in a lack of sufficient evidence to understand systemic change as related to climate vulnerability. Given the nature of funding of reviewed projects, and their often short-term interventions (1-3 years), rigorous impact evaluations are often cost prohibitive, stunting the generation of evidence. Stress tests and longitudinal studies would be effective in better understanding whether interventions are fit-for-purpose to address risks of climate and conflict, both now, and in the future.

# Section 4: Recommendations

Having reviewed the current state of the evidence and the compiled case studies, the workshop participants were asked to answer a number of questions:

- What interventions are clearly of value and should be scaled or mainstreamed?
- What interventions or approaches should be further developed or tested?
- What are the key questions for further research?
- Any other recommendations?

They made the following recommendations:

## Priority Interventions

The following are key entry points for reducing conflict and climate risks, and should be further scaled and mainstreamed where possible:

### Environmental peacebuilding, conflict sensitive adaptation and resilience building

There is nothing radically new or innovative in either environmental peacebuilding/NRM, nor in ensuring conflict sensitivity in adaptation (or broader development) interventions. Resilience approaches - that build the capacity of communities to deal with whatever shocks they are likely to face, be they conflict or climate related - have also been developed for at least two decades. However in a world threatened by both conflict and climate threats, and in recognition that each may compound the other, there is a strong case for much greater investment in such integrated approaches.

In general, given the need for scaling of environmental peacebuilding, conflict sensitive climate adaptation and resilience building, further analysis and more rigorous program evaluation, across multiple geographies, are required to identify the most effective approaches. It will be particularly essential to invest in program evaluations which seek to understand the degree to which these approaches build social cohesion (a core tenet of these approaches).

### Early warning and early response systems (EWER)

Although this was not included explicitly in many of the case studies, participants recognised that there are a number of early warning systems that integrate both climate and conflict risks, and that these should be adopted more widely in contexts facing both risks. Best practices in the formulation and management of EWER systems should be evaluated and disseminated, particularly in relation to their contribution to climate fragility. Finally, while prioritizing early warning and response systems, response plans and the allocation of resources to enable the implementation of plans must also be prioritized.

# Interventions and Tools That Should Be Further Developed or Piloted

## Integrated analysis

In order to identify more effective leverage points, and a broader palette of interventions, it is important to continue to invest in accessible and cost-effective national and local assessment processes that seek to better understand conflict-climate dynamics. While there are a number of well established sector based approaches to assessment and analysis, few take an approach that recognises the complexity of the dynamics. The development of new approaches which acknowledge this complexity, while also fitting into the standard programme lifecycle should be prioritised.

## Efforts to work beyond the community level - NRM & Livelihoods

Most of the interventions identified worked at the community level, facilitating more effective and peaceful cooperation around natural resources and increasing capacity for managing conflict. Only 2 projects explicitly tried to scale this to the sub-national, national level or international level; and few focused on the more systemic underlying drivers of conflict (such as poor governance, unequal power-sharing, or inequitable national policies around, for example, land use). Participants felt that such approaches should be a priority for further development.

Similarly, livelihoods change and diversification are recognised as a critical element of addressing conflict and climate issues, but again these are mostly developed on a very localised scale, and in a way that addresses relatively short-term risks (i.e. conflicts arising from immediate natural resource scarcity), avoiding or deprioritizing more systemic changes. These should be considered much more broadly, including in municipal and national development plans, and should consider the longer-term implications of climate change on livelihood security.

## Transboundary adaptation

Further focus should be brought to intra and inter governmental/authority (i.e. transboundary) cooperation on topics such as migration, adaptation and conflict management - particularly in contexts where there are common pool resources across borders.

## Production and uptake of 'consumable forecasting' and climate information services

Currently there is relatively limited uptake of even mid-range forecasting (3-6 months), let alone at the decades level. This is in part because current long term predictions are geographically very broad, making them difficult to apply in a particular location (with the exception of certain more extreme cases, such as Small Island Nations). Further work must be done to ensure climate analysis and predictions are accessible and useful in development of all kinds of programmes, including development and peacebuilding, and that policymakers also have the

tools to integrate such data. Most importantly, communities themselves need sustained access to relevant information as they make key decisions and trade-offs. Uptake of such information, however, will depend on local markets and other service providers' ability to provide necessary goods and services. As such, development strategies need to ensure market system development strategies correspond to seasonal forecasts, especially for recurring seasonal climate shocks.

## Translating early-warning into early action

As noted above, while there are a number of promising approaches to integrated early warning systems that are able to raise the alarm for both conflict and climate related risks, there is often a challenge in translating such warnings into early action. This is in part due to lack of resources among those (often local groups) who may be best placed to respond. Further work is needed to ensure early warning is linked to early action including ensuring new resources are available and the use of crisis modifiers to adapt existing programmes.

## Meso level governance capacity building

A number of interventions looked to improve governance at the local level, but not beyond. Often the most relevant institutions to key issues around conflict and climate are at the municipal, sub-national or national level, and yet few of the case studies we identified were working at these scales.This is especially true when it comes to the operationalization of well-meaning national policies which fail to materialize at the meso level due to lack of awareness, capacity or adequate incentives.

## Land security/tenure strategies and policies

Land security, tenure and use were identified a number of times as critical drivers of climate-related conflict, as well as barriers to effective adaptation in conflict affected places. However, none of the case studies we identified within this project were working on this issue. This should be an area for further development.

# Questions for Research

Although not the primary purpose of the workshop, participants flagged a number of questions for further research, including:

- What impact (positive or negative) could spending on climate change adaptation have on the social contract or state-citizen relationships? This could build off existing research on the impact of service provision.

- What contribution could increased stability or conflict reduction make to improved climate adaptation?

- What methods could most effectively measure the impact interventions that are seeking to reduce the role of climate change as a 'threat multiplier', particularly given the challenges around time scales and unpredictability of climate events.

- To what extent do similar capacities and interventions increase resilience to both climate change and conflict related shocks?

- Land use, land use change and land tenure and related governance inssues - what strategies and interventions are having a positive/negative role on conflict and climate dynamics, including the impact of climate mitigation on conflict.

- What are effective mechanisms for decentralised climate finance - ensuring they reach the local level, and is this more effective in addressing the impact of climate change on conflict?

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## Other Recommendations

A key challenge to effectively addressing conflict and climate is that an extremely broad range of actors, including experts from different disciplines, donors, civil society, the private sector, authorities and communities themselves will all have a critical role to play in developing and implementing effective solutions. This means far greater collaboration than is the norm, despite the contrasting objectives, language, budget cycles, timescales and risk appetite. Efforts to break down silos and to harmonise, sequence and learn from each others' interventions will be critical to success.

We hope that this project made a small contribution.

# ANNEX 1: LEXICON

| Term | Roots | Definition | Benefits | Drawbacks |
|------|-------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| **Environmental Peacebuilding** | Academia | Environmental peacebuilding integrates natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict. (source; Environmental Peacebuilding Association) | Environment as a connector, shared governance | Does not explicitly include forward thinking dynamics to include future impacts of climate change |
| **Climate Security** | Security, Defence, Academia | Recognition that climate-related change amplifies existing risks in society , and its implications on security apparatus' including for humans, ecosystems, economy, infrastructure and societies.(Source: Centre for Climate Security) | includes multiple systems perspectives | based in national security approaches to threat reduction , state as referent object |
| **Climate Change and Conflict** | Practitioner organisations, I/NGOs | The relationship between climate change, socioeconomic and political variables, and insecurity is complex and context specific. It requires a systemic approach to identify the challenges and design effective interventions. (Source: Mercy Corps) | Systems perspectives and context specific | Vague |
| **Climate Resilience** | Science; humanitaria | **Climate resilience** is the ability to anticipate, prepare | Allows a broad based | Complex and context |

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| | n and development organisations | for, and respond to hazardous events, trends, or disturbances related to **climate** (Source: Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions) | perspective on the likely hazards facing a community and focuses on their capacity to cope | specific, requiring reasonably detailed analysis to inform interventions |
| **Natural Resource Governance** | | The norms, institutions and processes that determine how power and responsibilities over natural resources are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how ...communities participate in and benefit from the management of natural resources (Source: IUCN) | Largest body of work and evidence | May not effectively incorporate climate shocks and changes |
| **Climate sensitive peacebuilding** | Peace and Conflict disciplines | Interventions that take into consideration the implications of near- and long-term climate risk as a contributing factor in driving conflict (source: IISD) | Bias towards peacebuilding | Grounded in good development practices and processes |
| **Conflict-sensitive climate change** | Climate science disciplines | Responses designed to ensure that, at a minimum, interventions do not increase the risk of conflict and, preferably, serve to enhance peacebuilding opportunities (source: IISD) | Bias towards climate implications | Grounded in good development practices and processes |

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